In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) 1997) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). Here, that law has been established by Doe, an intervening decision, and Doe’s application to the Sovereign Defendants and NCB is straightforward. Cf Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 102 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the district court’s dismissal of a claim because of “a change in the law during the pendency of th[e] appeal’). Jurisdictional discovery is necessary for both the Sovereign Defendants and NCB. Plaintiffs have raised allegations against the Sovereign Defendants that are substantively identical to the ones raised in *156 Doe, which the Court found required jurisdictional discovery.''* Cf Doe, 663 F.3d at 65, 71. Likewise, the district court previously noted the need for further jurisdictional discovery to resolve NCB’s status as a sovereign instrumentality in the first instance. See SPA12 (Terrorist Attacks I) (‘NCB submits that it is an instrumentality of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”). Doe makes plain that the proper course of action in such situations is to reverse and remand for such discovery. Doe, 663 F.3d at 65. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons and those provided in plaintiffs’ brief addressing personal jurisdiction, the Court should reverse the district court’s dismissal of certain defendants from these proceedings, reinstate the claims dismissed against them, and remand for further proceedings consistent with those determinations. Footnotes t The court dismissed approximately 20 defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), only five of which are the subject of this appeal. The district court also granted motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) filed by approximately 60 defendants, of which 36 are appellees herein, and further granted motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) with respect to nine defendants who claimed sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), three of which are a