In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) in part due to the failure of States to achieve anything like consensus on the definition of terrorism.” Jd. at 97. But it did so largely because there has been some disagreement among States on how to distinguish “terrorists” from “freedom fighters,” and because the district court had rested its holding on the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States instead of primary sources of international law. Jd. at 98-103, 107-08. Those concerns are not present here. Any disagreement about how to characterize attacks by domestic attacks within a country by national liberation movements is inapplicable to al-Qaeda’s international terrorist attacks on innocent civilians in the United States. See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 281; Bahlul, 2011 U.S. CMCR LEXIS 3 at *128. And the primary sources of international law discussed above reveal a customary norm of international law that directly covers the acts of international terrorism alleged in these cases -- transnational attacks, *134 and the provision of material support for such attacks, on innocent civilians intended to influence the conduct of a government or population by intimidation or coercion. That norm is no “less definite [in] content ... than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.” Sosa, 532 U.S. at 732; cf Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 184 (although there are varying definitions of piracy, it is actionable under the ATS because “ ‘whatever may be the diversity by definitions,’ ” there was a consensus “ ‘that robbery or forcible depredations upon the sea ... is piracy’ ”) (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (6 Wheat) 153, 159-61 (1820)). Finally, international terrorism is clearly “capable of impairing international peace and security,” Mores, 414 F.3d at 249, a factor this court has found to be “important” in demonstrating that the international law norm is of “ ‘mutual’ concern to States,” and thus ac