In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) necessary to mount a significant transborder attack. See JA3777-78. In particular, plaintiffs alleged that support during that crucial period enabled al-Qaeda to expand its footprint, train terrorists, plot and plan acts of terror, and carry out such acts around the world. JA798-800, 823, 843-44, 3783, 3836, 3871; cf SPA152 (Terrorist Attacks IV) (as the district court elsewhere acknowledged, “[s]ince its inception in the late 1980’s, al-Qaeda has relied on well-placed financial facilitators and logistical sponsors to raise, manage and distribute money and resources, enabling it to grow rapidly into a formidable international terrorist network”). Imposing ATA liability on defendants who provide this crucial formative support for a terrorist organization is clearly consistent with Congress’ intent, see supra pp. 66-73, and consistent with the nature of *119 how terrorist groups grow and become capable of undertaking attacks which, like the September 11 attacks, often take years of planning and development. See, e.g., 9/11 Commission Final Report p. 48. Thus, as the Seventh Circuit has held en banc, the ATA is predicated on the assumption that “[t]errorism campaigns often last for many decades .... Seed money for terrorism can sprout acts of violence long after the investment.” Boim IT, 549 F.3d at 700. The court went so far as to conclude that, as a general matter, imposing liability upon “someone who with the requisite state of mind contributed to a terrorist organization in 1995 that killed an American abroad in 2045 ... would not be as outlandish, given the character of terrorism, as one might think.” Jd. at 699-700. Here, of course, a much more direct connection of a few years exists between defendants’ acts that supported the development of what became the world’s most extensive and capable global terrorist organization and that group’s execution of its most sophisticated and deadly operation