In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) Thus, even in that more rigorous context, the D.C. Circuit has squarely rejected the approach taken by the district court here (ignoring the context of a defendant’s alleged actions and examining each allegation in isolation). For example, the habeas cases repeatedly find that an inference of al-Qaeda membership may be drawn from a pattern of dealing with persons associated with al-Qaeda or from sharing characteristics with those persons. See Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 (circumstantial evidence, in the form of repeated dealings with al-Qaeda, sufficient to establish membership) *112 (collecting cases). As the D.C. Circuit held, such “evidence tend[s] to show [the detainee’s] close relationship with these men and thus strengthen[s] the probability that he was part of al-Qaida.” Al Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109; accord Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 (“[detainee’s] actions and recurrent entanglement with al Qaeda show that he more likely than not was part of al Qaeda”). Just as clearly, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that courts “must view the evidence collectively rather than in isolation.” Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753. “Merely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the evidence ‘may be tossed aside and the next [piece of evidence] may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.’ ” Jd. (quoting Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105) (brackets in original). 4. The District Court Vailed to Accept the Truth of the Tacts Alleged. In considering a motion to dismiss, courts are of course under an obligation to “assume the[] veracity” of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and to view them “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Matson, 631 F.3d at 72. In addressing crucial allegations bearing directly on defendants’ state of mind, the district court failed to follow these basic principles. *113 For example, when analyzing t