In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) [the recipient] was funneling money to terrorist organizations”); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72649, at *47-49 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (drawing a reasonable inference that a bank “had reason to know” one of its customers was a terrorist group based on “public investigations of” the group and discussions within the press). In Wyatt, the district court drew upon public awareness that Iraq supported suicide bombers in Israel to “infer that ... the defendants knew the[ir kickbacks to Iraq] would be used for that purpose.” 785 F. Supp. 2d at 647-48. And in Weiss, the district court inferred that defendants “had reason to know the activities of its clients because of its legal and self-imposed obligations to know its customers.” *100 453 F. Supp. 2d at 627 n.15. Here, the facts alleged establish a general public awareness that the front charities supported by the defendants had been involved in acts of terrorism and actively aided al-Qaeda, and that the defendants had an obligation to know the source of their donations. These allegations give rise to a reasonable inference that defendants possessed the requisite mental state under the ATA, namely, that they knew or had reason to know the entities they supported were fronts for al-Qaeda. (c) Reasonable inference based on defendants’ extensive relationship with the al-Qaeda network. The plaintiffs also provided sufficient allegations connecting the defendants to the center of al-Qaeda’s network of terrorism, and individuals in the midst of al-Qaeda’s network are more likely to be part of al-Qaeda and at least well placed to know the nature of its activities. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that petitioner’s “close connection to the al-Qaida leadership ... strengthened the probability that he was part of al-Qaida’), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). As such, it is ent