In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) These allegations and al-Qaeda’s notorious nature make plain the district court’s failure to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants had the requisite mental state of knowingly or recklessly advancing the efforts of a terrorist organization, where the pleadings contained detailed allegations that they provided material support to al-Qaeda. A stark example is the district court’s failure to infer that Al Rajhi Bank knew or had reason to know that it was providing financial services to al-Qaeda, despite plaintiffs’ allegations that United States government officials -- “William Weschler of the National Security Council and Richard Newcomb of the Office of Foreign Assets Control” -- warned Al Rajhi Bank in 1999 “that their financial systems were being manipulated or utilized to fund terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.” SPAS5 (Terrorist Attacks I); JA1080-81. The district court simply noted that plainti ffs failed to allege “Al Rajhi Bank implemented ‘know your customer’ rules that Al Rajhi *93 failed to follow with respect to accounts held by the Defendant charities.” SPA57 (Terrorist Attacks I). The district court’s holding is not only inconsistent with Wuliz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 50-5, where the court inferred that the Bank of China knowingly provided financial services to a terrorist organizations based on allegations that it had been issued a warning by a Chinese official, but also is inconsistent with its own later decision. There, plaintiffs alleged that Dubai Islamic Bank provided banking services to al-Qaeda, even as the United States government had provided warnings to the United Arab Emirates in 1999. SPA199-200 (Terrorist Attacks IV). These allegations, the district court concluded, “g[a]ve rise to the inference that [Dubai Islamic Bank] intentionally and knowingly assisted al Qaeda by providing banking services ....” Jd. at 205. Similarly, the allegations against Al Rajhi Ban