In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) remaining defendants, who allegedly held more junior positions in foreign governments, was unclear. Struggling to interpret the precise meaning of Terrorist Attacks III’s personal jurisdiction holding, plaintiffs submitted that the decision could be interpreted as drawing a distinction between direct and indirect support of terrorism for due process purposes, and that Terrorist Attacks [IIT should not be read to allow defendants with direct ties to al-Qaeda to evade jurisdiction. Plaintiffs expressly reserved their right to argue on appeal that, among other things, a rule immunizing indirect sponsors of terrorism from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for injuries *17 suffered in the United States on due process grounds is incorrect and inconsistent with controlling precedent. For their part, the defendants asserted that Terrorist Attacks IIT should be read to require, for purposes of due process, a showing that the defendant “intentionally provided funding to support the September 11 attacks against the United States.” R.2140, 1-2, 13. On February 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority bringing to the district court’s attention the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2008 (en banc) (Boim ITD). R. 2156. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit comprehensively discussed the substantive liability standards governing civil claims under the ATA, and the findings and policies that prompted the Legislative and Executive Branches to establish a civil cause of action for the benefit of terror victims against material sponsors and supporters of terrorism. The Boim HI court held that liability under the ATA extends to any person who knowingly or recklessly provided material support or resources to the terrorist organization responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, whether directly or indirectly, and that a plain