The Crooked Course XXXV early 2001 in the small Egyptian seaside town of Taba. They attempted, through bilateral talks, to capitalize on the basic ideas put forward by President Clinton. In spite of high hopes inspired by the Taba talks, hope was dashed by Israeli intransigence, reinforced by the violent uprising across the West Bank and Gaza, as well as internal tensions within the Palestinian leadership. In an attempt to revive the peace process, President George W. Bush, in a speech in the Rose Garden in June 2002, took the bold step of publicly declaring support for an independent Palestinian state. However, he was convinced that Chairman Arafat was an impediment to peace, due to the continuing violence against Israelis emanating from Gaza and the West Bank. The President made further US involvement in peace negotiations contingent upon Arafat’s removal from power, and the implementation of democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority’s political structure. This was consist- ent with Prime Minister Sharon’s policies. At this time, parts of the Palestinian leadership either passively turned a blind eye to the rise of bombings in Israel, or discreetly encouraged it. Arafat became a pariah for several essential players and was isolated in his Muqata headquarters in Ramallah. Under these dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of his executive office at United Nations’ Headquarters in New York with the US, Russia, and the European Union. The frustration was deep amongst all parties. Bilateral talks did not happen. Trilateral talks did not work. In response to the breakdown of the peace process, he suggested that the four actors coordinate a position to restart the process. The idea was to combine the political power of the US, Russia’s credibility amongst key Arab states, the European Union’s financial muscle, and the UN’s legitimacy in a potent new international coalition. The UN Secretary-General coined