Or In May of 2011, SEC entered into its first deferred Enforcement Manual. The same factors that apply to SEC prosecution agreement against a company for violating the staffs determination of whether to recommend an enforce- FCPA.*® In that case, a global manufacturer of steel pipe ment action against an individual or entity apply to the products violated the FCPA by bribing Uzbekistan govern- decision to close an investigation without recommending ment officials during a bidding process to supply pipelines enforcement action.>” for transporting oil and natural gas. The company made Generally, SEC staff considers, among other things: almost $5 million in profits when it was subsequently e the seriousness of the conduct and potential viola- awarded several contracts by the Uzbekistan government. tions; The company discovered the misconduct during a world- e the resources available to SEC staff to pursue the wide review of its operations and brought it to the govern- investigation; ment’s attention. In addition to self-reporting, the company e the sufficiency and strength of the evidence; conducted a thorough internal investigation; provided e the extent of potential investor harm if an action is complete, real-time cooperation with SEC and DOJ staff; not commenced; and and undertook extensive remediation, including enhanced e the age of the conduct underlying the potential anti-corruption procedures and training. Under the terms violations. of the DPA, the company paid $5.4 million in disgorge- SEC has declined to take enforcement action against ment and prejudgment interest. The company also paid a both individuals and companies based on the facts and cir- $3.5 million monetary penalty to resolve a criminal investi- cumstances present in those matters, where, for example, gation by DOJ through an NPA.* the conduct was not egregious, the company fully coop- For further information about deferred prosecution erated, and the company identified and remediated the agreem