Federal Register/Vol. 76, No. 168/Tuesday, August 30, 2011/Rules and Regulations 54013 But even if the new rule is understood plummeted to approximately 8 percent. evidence that Congress had considered to compel employer speech, Section 8(c) Asa result, fewer employees today have and rejected inserting such a “merely implements the First direct, everyday access to animportant requirement into the Act. However, Amendment.’” Brown, 554 U.S. at 67 source of information regarding NLRA nothing in the legislative history of the (quoting NLEB v. Gissel Packing Co., rights and the Board’s ability to enforce Act so indicates. Indeed, there is not the 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)). Thus, if a those rights. slightest hint that the omission of a First Amendment challenge to the rule As noted above, “[t]he responsibility notice-posting requirement was the must fail, so too must a challenge based _ to adapt the Act to changing patterns of product of legislative compromise and on Section 8(c). Such was the holding industrial life is entrusted to the Board.’’ therefore implies congressional rejection of the D.C. Circuit in UAW v. Chao. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 266. It of the idea. Cf. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy There, the court was presented with a would therefore be an abdication of that Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. preemption argument, grounded in responsibility for the Board to decline to Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 384-85 (7th Cir. Section 8(c), challenging a Federal adopt this rule simply because of its 2010) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) procurement regulation that required recent vintage. Accordingly, the Board (inferring a private right of action from contractors to post a notice informing finds such arguments unpersuasive. statutory silence in a case where such their employees of certain NLRA rights. 4, Comparison With Other Statutes That silence was not the product of The D.C. Circuit interpreted Section 8(c) Contain Notice-Posting Requirements legislative compromis