en { Fittuy Ricu -cutors presented Epstein a well-known legal experts. One member of the defense us state felony charges (that team warned me that the office’s excess zeal in forcing a prisonment, registration as a good man to serve time in jail might be the subject of a ition for the victims) or else : book if we continued to proceed with the matter. My tial. ’ office systematically considered and rejected each argu- -ar-long assault on the prose- = ment, and when we did, my office’s decisions were J use the word assault inten- : appealed to Washington. As to the warning, I ignored it. his case was more aggressive 4 3 The defense strategy was not limited to legal issues. srosecutors in my office, had 4 : Defense counsel investigated individual prosecutors and tr. Epstein hired an army of : their families, looking for personal peccadilloes that may rofessor Alan Dershowitz, for- 4 a provide a basis for disqualification. Disqualifying a pros- dine Law Dean Kenneth Starr, ; : 4 ecutor is an effective (though rarely used) strategy, as ) the President and then Kirk- 4 4 eliminating the individuals most familiar with the facts efkowitz, and several others, a q and thus most qualified to take a case to trial harms like- >) had formerly worked in the a lihood for success. Defense counsel tried to disqualify at in the Child Exploitation and 4 least two prosecutors. I carefully reviewed, and then Justice Department. Defense 4 q rejected, these arguments. | meeting with me to challenge : 4 Despite the army of attorneys, the office held firm to terms previously presented by 3 j the terms first presented to Mr. Black in the original meeting with Mr. Black. The 4 4 meeting. On June 30, 2008, after yet another last minute et with defense counsel in Fall q 1 appeal to Washington D.C. was rejected, Epstein pled re office's position: two years, : 7 guilty in state court. He was to serve 18 months impris- n, or trial. a _ onment, register as a sexual offender for life, and provide mo