Page |89 people in pain. Altogether, there is and resistance to interference), functions strong evidence to suggest that that are predominantly centered in the perceiving the pain of others triggers an prefrontal cortex which continues to automatic somatic sensory-motor mature from birth to adolescence. mirroring mechanism between other and Theoretically, imagining the other is self, which activates almost the entire distinct from imagining the self: the neural pain matrix including the former may evoke empathic concern periaqueductal gray, a major site in pain (defined as an other-oriented response transmission and for processing of fear congruent with the perceived distress of and anxiety, and the supplementary the person in need) while the latter motor area that programs defensive induces both empathic concern and movements in response to anticipated personal distress (1.e., a self-oriented pain. Such a neural resonance aversive emotional response such as mechanism provides a functional bridge anxiety or discomfort). This distinction between first-person and third-person has been supported empirically. When information. It is grounded in the individuals are asked to imagine how equivalence of self and other, which they would feel in reaction to emotion- allows for analogical reasoning, and laden familiar situations and to imagine offers a possible, yet partial, route to how a known person would feel if she understanding others. was experiencing the same situations, Gf vourse, homan empaths common neural circuits are activated abilities are more sophisticated than both for the self and the olber. Hawever, simply yoking perceptions of the self Telative 1 magunns the self, maging and other. In the eighteenth century, the other results in specific activation of Scottish philosopher and economist parts Grmite suemeal cortex that are Adam Smith proposed that through implicated in executive control—the use imagination, “we place ourselves in his ot aulenuon an WoLKIng