Page |59 a shared social goal. Sometimes the goal individual-centered reasons, motives, is spontaneous as in clapping to intentions, and causes may be at odds demonstrate appreciation and sometimes with some forms of spontaneously the goal is imposed by the situation (e.g., synchronized behaviors and group musicians following a musical score and action. instructions ofa conductor, soldiers Towards a Biology of Social marching to the call of a drill sergeant). . . Interaction However, when we behave in synchrony with others, there is a sense of becoming Consider the perspective of an part of something larger than ourselves. engaged spectator at a singles tennis : match. Although we may be sitting To the people engaged in . . . . . ; . distant from competitors, if we identify spontaneously synchronized behavior, : . . . with one of the players we are not there is a clearly identifiable and ‘ . rae : 5 . merely passive observers. On the seemingly individual ‘cause’ for their : : . contrary, our observation of the events in emergent behavior. But when a group . . the game can serve to activate some of shares the same goal—demonstrating 2 . the same neural mechanisms that would approval—and engages in the same senor . . . : be active if we were playing the game action—clapping—the stage is set for . sn : ; rather than just observing it. We can feel such behavior to become coordinated ‘ . . the moves, feel the impetus to defend an and organized even without an external . attack, and feel the urge to slam the ball agent (conductor or drill sergeant). How ; : ; ' as if we ourselves are playing, albeit do those moments of spontaneous social . 1: . . without actually flailing our arms aggregation occur? How does the social ‘ot ; seer around. We may even anticipate a move brain work to join with others to form by th di : 1 the emergent group? y the opponent and imagine ourselves ; making the potential response. Research We have begun to understand the over the last 10 years or