2 MICHAEL WOLFF SIEGE House rather than, in a distinction Trump could never firmly grasp, the issues that would immediately need to be addressed if he were to ta president himself—demonstrated little ability to make problems disap- on the case. Trump refused to consider any of them. More than a doz pear and became a constant brunt of Trump's rages and invective. His legal major firms had turned down his business. In the end, Trump was left wi interpretation of proper executive branch function too often thwarted his a ragtag group of solo practitioners without the heft and resources of t boss's wishes. firms. Now, thirteen months after his inauguration, he was facing px Dowd and his colleagues, Ty Cobb and Jay Sekulow—the trio of law- sonal legal trouble at least as great as that faced by Richard Nixon and E yers charged with navigating the president through his personal legal Clinton, and doing so with what seemed like, at best, a Court Street le; problems—had, on the other hand, become highly skilled in avoiding team. But Trump appeared to be oblivious to this exposed flank. Ratch: their client's bad humor, which was often accompanied by menacing, ing up his level of denial about the legal threats around him, he breez barely controlled personal attacks. All three men understood that to be a rationalized: “If I had good lawyers, I'd look guilty.” successful lawyer for Donald Trump was to tell the client what he wanted Dowd, at seventy-seven, had had a long, successful legal career, be to hear. in government and in Washington law firms. But that was in the past. ] Trump harbored a myth about the ideal lawyer that had almost noth- was on his own now, eager to postpone retirement. He knew the imp« ing to do with the practice of law. He invariably cited Roy Cohn, his old tance, certainly to his own position in Trump's legal circle, of und New York friend, attorney, and tough-guy mentor, and Robert Kennedy, standing his client’s needs. He was forced to agree with the pre