185 adversary services, which also had the home court advantage, from stepping in. He also gave adversaries an ample, if not wholly irresistible reason, to enter the game by saying that he had access to NSA’s sources in China. How could they resist such a prize? As confidant as Snowden may have been that he was in control, the CIA believed that confidence was misinformed. CIA Deputy Director Morell said, after reviewing the case on a panel appointed by President Obama: “Snowden thinks he is smart, but he was never in a position in his previous jobs to fully understand the immense capabilities of our Russian and Chinese counterparts.” He could adopt a self-confident tone in his post-mortem conversations with journalists in Moscow, but he had no means to block the efforts of the Chinese or Russian services in Hong Kong. These intelligence services had no restrictions on their actions. For example, the Chinese intelligence service could have spotted him on his arrival in Hong Kong simply by cross- checking its aforementioned database of US intelligence workers who had applied for a renewed security clearance in the past three years. It could have pinpointed his whereabouts through its informant network in the Hong Kong Police and the security staffs of hotels. Snowden’s mysterious “carer” would not be immune from detection by that network. Russia, China’s longtime intelligence ally, would not even need to go to such lengths since, as Putin gloatingly confirmed, he contacted its diplomats in Hong Kong. The Russian intelligence service would them swing into action while Russian “diplomats” entered into talks with him. The Russians would also glean from Snowden’s request for asylum that Hong Kong was only a temporary stopover for him, “The purpose of my [Hong Kong} mission was to get the information to journalists,” he would tell the Guardian after he was safely ensconced in Moscow. After that brief mission, he was “done” in Hong Kong. Where he planned to go next, mai