136 image. The 35-page Defense Intelligence Agency’s damage assessment, for example, that said that 900,000 Pentagon documents were compromised by Snowden, was nor made public. It was only disclosed via a Vice magazine Freedom of Information request in June 2015. What is known is the number of documents that Snowden gave to journalists in Hong Kong. As will be recalled, Poitras and Greenwald were “writing partners.” When Greenwald discovered that his copy of the documents were corrupted, Poitras made a copy of the thumb drive that Snowden gave her in Hong Kong and sent it to her Greenwald in Rio de Janeiro by a courier. That courier was intercepted by British authorities at Heathrow Airport. When examined, the Poitras-Greenwald thumb drive contained some 58,000 documents. This meant that the lion’s share of the 1.3 million documents that the NSA claimed were compromised had not been given to journalists and is unaccounted for. The numbers game is not only misleading nut unenlightening on the issue of the value of the compromised documents. Many of the putative 1.3 million documents that the NSA says were copied and moved were duplicate copies. Others were outdated or otherwise useless routing data. So the quantity does not tell the story. Of far more importance than the quantity of the total haul is the quality of some of the data that Snowden had copied. Just a single one of these documents could cripple not just the NSA but America’s entire multi-billion dollar apparatus for intercepting foreign intelligence. The previously-cited summary of requests by the CIA, FBI, Pentagon and other agencies for communications intelligence, for example, which was 31,000 pages long, listed all the gaps in U.S. coverage of adversaries, including those cited by President Obama’s national security team. As Ledgett warned, this single document, if it fell into enemy hands, would provide out adversaries with “a roadmap of what we know what we don’t know and imp/licitly a way to prot