132 am still working for the NSA right now. They are the only ones who don’t realize it.” While he might have sincerely persuaded himself that he was somehow helping US communications intelligence in a self-appointed role, those familiar with the activities of the Russian security services find it inconceivable that he could escape their control in Russia. At the very minimum, a former US intelligence worker who stole American state secrets, such as Snowden, would be under the FSB’s scrutiny. Andrei Soldatov, the co-author of the 2010 book The New Nobility: the Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, and who was personal knowledgeable about FSB procedures, explained the FSB would monitor “every facet of Snowden's communications, and his life.” General Oleg Kalugin, who, as previously mentioned, defected from the KGB to the United States in 1995, added that the FSB following the standard operating procedures of the KGB, would be “his hosts and they are taking care of him.” Kalugin further said in 2014 that “Whatever he had access to in his former days at NSA, I believe he shared all of it with the Russians, and they are very grateful” American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA, CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibility than Snowden would be induced to cooperate in this situation, saying “I would lose all respect for the Russian and Chinese security services if they haven’t fully exploited everything Snowden had to give.” They certainly had that opportunity at Sheremetyevo International Airport: He had already, at least in the eyes of the Department of Justice, betrayed US secrets by stealing them and taking them abroad. Snowden was held in limbo in the transit zone. The FSB controlled his access to food, lodgings, the Internet, and whatever