4] one not having the necessary passwords and other access privileges, could steal documents that betrayed these vital sources. He also demonstrated that such a theft, which the NSA calculates exceeded one million documents, can go undetected for at least two weeks. If Snowden managed this feat on his own, as he claims in his Hong Kong video, it suggests that any other civilian employee with a perceived grievance against NSA practices or American foreign policy could also walk away with some of the most precious secrets held by US intelligence. Such vulnerability extends to tens of thousands of civilian contract employees in positions similar to the one held by Snowden. The lone disgruntled employee explanation is therefore hardly reassuring. If true, calls into question the entire multi-billion dollar enterprise of outsourcing the management of the NSA’s computer networks and other technical work to outside contractors. It also casts doubts on the post-9/11 decision by the intelligence community to strip away much of the NSA’s “stove- piping” that previously insulated the NSA’s most sensitive computers. Without such “stove- piping,” any rogue civilian employee could bring down entire edifice of shared intelligence. Nor would a finding by the investigation that Snowden had acted in concert with others in breaching compartments at the NSA be any more reassuring. Such collaboration among intelligence workers would reflect gravely on the mindset of the NSA. Snowden described an atmosphere in which intelligence workers exchanged lewd photographs of foreign suspects. Did this violation of the NSA’s rules also involve abetting the theft of documents? If so, the NSA would have to evaluate further vulnerabilities that might arise when it entrusts its secrets to technicians who do not share is values. A collaborative breach would signal an immense failure of the present concept of the counterintelligence regime in the NSA. From what I gathered from government officials wh