39 23" but in actuality it had acted on June 22, 2013, which was the day before the plane (or Snowden) departed from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities had been advised as early as June 19, 2013 that there were criminal charges against Snowden and only a typographical error in spelling out Snowden’s middle name—James instead of John-- in the criminal charges prevented the Hong Kong police from immediately ordering his detention. His Hong Kong lawyers were advised of the pending charges, which were unsealed on June 21, 2013 and published on front page of the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. So presumably Snowden knew that action by the U.S. government was imminent. One of his lawyers, Jonathan Mann, even accompanied Snowden to the airport out of his concern that he would not even be allowed by Hong Kong authorities to go through passport control. Although Snowden still had a US passport in his possession, the computerized database would show on June 23rd, it was no longer valid for travel to anywhere but the U.S. This electronic notification advised foreign government that his passport was only approved for his return to the U.S. Even so, when he arrived in Russia any future international travel decisions for him would be up to Russia, not the U.S. So the only government with the means to “trap” him in Russia was the Russian government. The U.S. government also knew that his it was no accident that Snowden wound up in the hands of Russia. He had been in contact with Russian officials in Hong Kong. Even before Putin admitted this liaison on September 3, 2013, the CIA knew about it. In fact, on June 23™, t, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), correctly said based on a White House briefing that “Vladimir Putin had personally approved Snowden’s flight” to Moscow. As mentioned earlier, the NSA still had the capability to monitor Russian communication in June 2013. The messages, as well as the traffic, it intercepted from its sources reportedly revealed the Russia