34 retracing all his activities at the NSA over the past four years. To begin with, they needed to find out how many documents from the Center had been copied and taken by Snowden. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon’s own intelligence service, meanwhile was kept partially in the dark. It did not learn from the NSA that Snowden had stolen military documents, concerning the joint Cyber Command until July 10, 2013. In terms of sheer quantity, the number of stolen military documents was staggering. The DIA found that Snowden had copied “over 900,000” military files. Many of these files came from this joint command, which had been set up in 2011 by the NSA and Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force cryptological services to combat the threat of warfare in cyberspace. The loss was considered of such importance that between 200 and 2500 military intelligence officers worked day and night for the next four months, according to the DIA’s classified report, to "triage, analyze, and assess Department of Defense impacts related to the Snowden compromise." The job of this unit, called the Joint Staff Mitigation Oversight Task Force, was to attempt to contain the damage caused by the Snowden breach. In many cases, containment meant shutting down NSA operations in China, Russia, North Korea and Iran so they could not be used to confuse and distract the U.S. military. The NSA and Defense Department were not the only government agencies concerned with determining the extent of the breach. There was also the CIA. The NSA acted as a service organization for it, handling most, if not all, of its requests for communication intelligence to support its international espionage operations. Although the CIA and NSA were both part of the so-called “Intelligence Community,” the NSA did not immediately share with the CIA details of the Snowden breach. Despite the immense potential damage of the theft, it was not until a week later that CIA Director John Owen Brennan and Deputy Dire