| ® || The Espionage Source | 289 allow him to copy, transfer, and steal the electronic files. He there- fore must have obtained that assistance from someone who had the passwords and privileges. Other workers there might have shared his sensibilities and antipathy toward NSA surveillance. It there- fore seems entirely plausible that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate or, vice versa, a co-worker found him. Snowden might not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives or affili- ations, but without some co-worker’s providing him with entry to the sealed-off computers, he could not have carried out the penetra- tion. To our knowledge, whoever helped him evidently did not want to expose himself to prosecution or defect from the NSA. That was Snowden’s role. By accepting the sole blame in the video that Poitras made about him in Hong Kong, Snowden shielded anyone else from suspicion, which was, as he told Poitras, his purpose. Whoever helped him may still be working at the NSA. To be sure, there remains that other glaring gap in the chain of events that led Snowden to Moscow: his whereabouts and activi- ties during his first eleven days in Hong Kong. Mike Rogers, the © chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, even sug- ® gested, without any evidence, that Snowden might have been taken to mainland China during this period. What drove his speculation was the admission of U.S. intelligence that despite its vast global resources for searching credit card charges, banking transactions, hotel registrations, e-mails, police records, and even CCTV cameras, neither it nor its allies were able to find a trace of Snowden during that time. It was, in a phrase made famous by the former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, “a known unknown.” Just as likely he could have been staying in a well-prepared safe house anywhere in Hong Kong or even at the home of an unknown associate. All that is really known is that soon after he emerged from this venue, mov