| ® | Through the Looking Glass | 259 I began by asking him about one of the more celebrated cases he had handled for the KGB, that of Ames, who had acted as a Russian mole in the CIA between April 1985 and January 1994. In those nine years, he rose, or was maneuvered by the KGB, into a top position in the CIA’s highly sensitive Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group, which allowed him to deliver hundreds of top secrets to the KGB. In return, according to Cherkashin, Ames received between $20,000 and $50,000 in cash for each delivery, which amounted to $4.6 million over the nine years. I asked Cherkashin about the weakness the KGB looked for in an American intelligence worker that might lead him to copy and steal top secret documents. How did he spot a potential Ames? Was it a financial problem? Was it a sexual vulnerability? Was it an ideologi- cal leaning? “Nothing so dramatic,” he answered. When assessing Ames’s biographical data, Cherkashin said he was looking for a well-placed intelligence officer who was both dissatisfied with and antagonistic to the service for which he worked. © “The classic disgruntled employee,” I interjected. ® “Any intelligence officer who strongly feels that his superiors are not listening to him, and that they are doing stupid things, is a can- didate,” he continued. He said he had found that the flaw in a pros- pect that could be most dependably exploited was not his greed, lust, or deviant behavior but his resentment over the way he was being treated. “Is that how you spotted Ames?” “Actually, he approached us, not vice versa.” It was his job in the CIA to approach opposition KGB officers. “But, yes, we saw the potential,” he said. Because Ames had been paid $50,000 in cash by Cherkashin for his first delivery, I asked whether he fit into the category of a dis- gruntled employee. “Wasn't he just a mercenary?” I asked. “I knew from our intelligence reports that he needed money for debts stemming from his divorce,” he answ