| ® || 244 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS was a nervous period,” Snowden recalled. Although he bravely told The Guardian “there was no risk” that the information he carried had been compromised by other parties in Hong Kong, that claim was, at best, wishful thinking on his part. By this time, he had registered at the hotel under his true name and provided his credit card; he was in contact with three high- profile journalists, two well-known hacktivists, and, as he suggested to Gellman, a foreign diplomatic mission. The mission’s interest would likely be piqued when the news- paper published its first story on June 6. Greenwald then went on TV in Hong Kong, revealing to every interested intelligence service that a defector from the NSA was in Hong Kong providing secret documents. Poitras released the famous video showing Snowden and secret NSA documents three days later. At this point, Snowden shone brightly as a beacon to NSA secrets to every player in the intelli- gence game, even if they did not know the extent of the damage he could inflict on American intelligence. © Snowden fogged over his travel plans to the media by telling re) reporters that he intended to remain in Hong Kong and fight extra- dition, but certainly the Russian officials whom he contacted became aware that he had other plans, having relayed his request to go to Russia to their superiors in Moscow. And, unlike the media, any sophisticated intelligence service was well aware of his movements. In Hong Kong, cell phones emit their GPS location every three sec- onds; even if Snowden disabled his own phone, lawyers and helpers could be tracked with ease. China’s president, Xi Jinping, who was meeting President Obama for the first time in Rancho Mirage, California, on June 8, would have been keenly interested in the unfolding Snowden affair. Obama had publicly called Xi to task for Chinese cyber espionage, and now that charge was undermined by Snowden’s accusation that the United States was engaged