| ® || The Chinese Puzzle | 239 tains there its largest intelligence base outside mainland China. A large contingent of its officers are stationed officially in the Prince of Wales skyscraper in central Hong Kong and unofficially main- tain informers in Hong Kong’s police, governing authority, airport administration, and other levers of power. It checks the computer- ized visitors entering Hong Kong and has the capability to ferret names that match those in the immense database its global cyber espionage has amassed. When it detects the entry of any person of possible intelligence interest, it can use its sophisticated array of cyber tools to attempt to remotely steal data from that individual. Such remote surveillance was so effective in 2013 that the U.S. State Department had instructed all its personnel in Hong Kong to avoid using their iPhones, Androids, BlackBerry phones, and other smart phones when traveling to Hong Kong or China. Instead, it supplied them with specially altered phones that disable location tracking and have a remotely activated switch to completely cut off power to its circuitry. No one in the intelligence community doubts the prudence of taking such precautions in China, and it is nearly incon- © ceivable that Snowden, whose prior position at the NSA included re) teaching military personnel about Chinese capacities, could himself be unaware of Chinese intelligence service capabilities to acquire travelers’ data in Hong Kong. Once Hong Kong had served as a window into China for West- ern intelligence, but in the first decade of this century the Chinese intelligence service had achieved such a pervasive presence in Hong Kong, and such ubiquitous electronic coverage of diplomats and other foreigners even suspected of involvement in foreign intelli- gence work, that the CIA and British intelligence found it almost as difficult to operate in Hong Kong as in mainland China. Even though the CIA kept officers there in 2013, it was considered “ho