| ® | 168 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS all requests to meet with any representative of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. From that point on, he would act as Snowden’s go-between with the FSB and other Russian agencies. At the outset, Kucherena made it clear to Snowden that he would have to play by Moscow’s rules before the Kremlin would grant him permission to stay in Russia. To begin with, Snowden had to with- draw any applications he had made elsewhere for asylum. He had to put his fate entirely in the hands of Putin’s Russia. He would also have to be fully candid with the Russian authorities on what was of great value to Putin: the secret documents he had acquired. Eighteen days later, Snowden received Russian identification papers that allowed him to resettle in Moscow. He was provided with a residence and allowed to set up a broadcasting studio in it that he could use for Internet appearances at well-attended events around the world, such as South by Southwest and TED. Snowden was, according to Kucherena, also furnished with bodyguards. To help earn his keep, he was said by Kucherena to be employed at an unidentified Moscow cyber-security firm. To complete his resettle- © ment, Lindsay Mills, whom he had left behind in Hawaii, was given ® a three-month visa and was allowed to temporarily live with him in Moscow. This afforded him a lifestyle that Snowden described in an interview as “great.” It would strain credibility that such privileges would be awarded to an intelligence defector who had refused to cooperate with Russian authorities. In Snowden’s case, he was even allowed to participate in Putin’s telethon on state-controlled television. On it, he was called on to ask Putin if the Russian government violated the privacy of Russian citizens in the same way that the American government violated the rights of its citizens. Putin, smiling at Snowden’s pre- sumably vetted question, answered in a single word: “No.” In the Moscow scenario, the Russians acted to advanc