| ® || 164 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS have been reeled in unwittingly. Morell suggested in his book that Snowden might not himself have fully realized “when and how he would be used.” It can be safely assumed that the decision made by Putin’s intel- ligence service to allow Snowden to travel to Russia proceeded from something other than softhearted sentiment about his welfare. After Putin learned that there was an American in Hong Kong from the “special services” seeking to come to Russia, he also learned from Snowden’s own disclosure on the video released that Snowden had taken a large number of NSA documents to Hong Kong: indeed, some were shown on the video. After that self-outing by Snowden, Putin had plenty of time to calculate the advantages and disadvan- tages of allowing him to come to Moscow. Putin could offer him not only freedom from arrest but also a platform to express his views. The exploitation of an intelligence defector, even after he yields his secrets, can be the final stage of a successful intelligence operation. The CIA considered one of its greatest coups of the Cold War its release of the espionage-acquired © secret speech of Nikita Khrushchev to the Communist Party of the re) Soviet Union in 1956 exposing the transgressions of the previous regime of Joseph Stalin. Making public these deeds was meant by the CIA to sow discord both inside the Soviet Union and to disrupt its relations with its allies. General Alexander suggested that Putin might similarly be “looking to capitalize on the fact that [Snowden’s] actions are enormously disruptive and damaging to US interests.” This potential gain, if Alexander’s assessment is correct, provided Putin with an additional reason to have his representatives in Hong Kong offer Snowden exfiltration. Snowden was in no position to refuse. After the release of the video, there was no going back to America without his facing a determined criminal prosecution. He would have known that in almost every prior