| ® | The Crime Scene Investigation | 143 charges prevented the Hong Kong police from immediately order- ing his detention. His Hong Kong lawyers were certainly advised of these pending charges no later than June 21, when they were pub- lished on the front page of the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. Presumably, Snowden knew that actions by the U.S. govern- ment were already in progress and that one of these actions would include restricting his passport. One of his lawyers, Jonathan Man, even accompanied Snowden to the airport out of his concern that he would not be allowed by Hong Kong authorities to go through pass- port control. Ordinarily, Hong Kong passport control scans passports when tourists exit but does not check them against a computerized database. In any case, when Snowden arrived in Russia on June 23, any future international travel decisions for him would be up to the gov- ernment of Russia, not that of the United States. It could have sent him back to Hong Kong, as is normally done when someone arrives without a proper visa, or to the United States. The only govern- ment with the actual means to “trap” him in Russia was the Russian © government. © Senior intelligence officials also knew that the U.S. government, rather than conspiring to keep Snowden in Moscow, had met nearly every day while he was in Hong Kong with Lisa Monaco, President Obama’s homeland security adviser, in the White House Situation Room to find a way to prevent Snowden and his cache of secrets from falling into Russian hands. Robert S. Mueller III, then the FBI director, reportedly even directly appealed to the FSB head, Alexan- der Bortnikov, to return Snowden to the United States. USS. intelligence also knew that it was no accident that Snowden wound up in the hands of Russia. He had been in contact with Rus- sian officials in Hong Kong. It will be recalled that Putin admitted to this liaison on September 3, ina press briefing on state-owned Chan- nel One television;