| ® | Fugitive | 107 tacts with Russia while still in Hong Kong. When Lana Lam asked Snowden on June 12, 2013, whether he had already requested asy- lum from the Russian government, he deferred, saying, “My only comment is that I am glad there are governments that refuse to be intimidated by great power.” The Russian government was clearly not intimidated by the threats of reprisals by the United States, as the Obama administration would learn after Snowden’s arrival in Russia on June 23. Snowden could only have known that with cer- tainty on June 12 if he had been in contact with Russian officials prior to his interview with Lam. If Putin’s own description of Snowden’s interactions with the Russians in Hong Kong is to be believed, the decision to facilitate Snowden’s escape to Russia had been kicked all the way up the Rus- sian chain of command to Putin. Presumably, this decision-making process began earlier than June 21, when Snowden was said to have gone to the consulate. But how much earlier? Because Snowden had arrived in Hong Kong on May 20, his contacts with Russian offi- cials could have occurred in May. Such a contact with the Russians © would fit with Snowden’s telling Gellman on May 24 that he needed ® his help in dealing with the diplomatic mission of a country that Snowden did not identify. In any case, Putin said an American “agent of the special services” had contacted Russian diplomats because he wanted assistance. The agent, Snowden, of course, needed assistance to escape from Hong Kong. The decision to accept him in Russia, given the international ramifications, would have to be made at a much higher level than the Russian mission in Hong Kong. Nine days before Snowden boarded Aeroflot Flight SU213 to Moscow on June 23, the United States had filed a criminal complaint against him. It had also officially alerted Interpol when it unsealed the complaint on June 21. It had invalidated his U.S. passport except to return to America (although he stil