| ® | Enter Assange | 103 Because Hong Kong had a vigorously enforced extradition agree- ment with the United States, as mentioned above, it was expected that Snowden would be taken into custody. But China had the final say in any extradition decision. In fact, China had explicitly been given the right of vetoing any extraditions for any reason in the formal 1999 agreement between Hong Kong and the United States. Because the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, had just met with Presi- dent Obama in California, China also had an interest in avoiding embarrassing public demonstrations on behalf of Snowden. Accord- ing to a well-placed official in Hong Kong, China’s liaison office in Hong Kong told the Hong Kong Authority in no uncertain terms that Snowden had to be out of Hong Kong by June 23. On June 19, Snowden had a meeting with Tibbo, the barrister who would handle any eventual court case, and Man and Ho, the Hong Kong solicitors who had been retained for him. It took place in a small apartment where, according to Ho, they ate pizza while they discussed Snowden’s options. Tibbo wanted Snowden to remain in Hong Kong, allow himself © to be arrested, seek bail, and fight extradition in court. Tibbo said re) he planned to mount a powerful legal defense against extradition by using a provision in Hong Kong’s extradition treaty with the United States that protects fugitives from persecution on political grounds. After he told Snowden that it would entail a long court battle, Snowden asked him if he could avoid even being arrested. Tibbo explained that Hong Kong courts, which closely follow British law, would certainly issue an arrest warrant for him imme- diately after the United States formally filed charges against him. Those charges could come within hours, he reckoned. Soon after- ward, Snowden would be temporarily jailed, and his computers, electronic gear, and thumb drives would be seized and placed in the custody of the court. Tibbo would immediately seek his rel