symphonic effort, each note and instrument in place. Grand strategy tells us what to do at every moment. Any policy, then, must begin with a summary of our aims: “We believe the world is entering a period of profound change that demands a shift in global arrangements. We are building a gatekept order consistent with our values. We welcome others to participate in it - but with conditions. We will resist attempts to force nations into any gatekept order; we will fight any forces that threaten disruption of the overall system.” The China policy that emerges from this view is clear enough: We will not contain China. We will not force China to change. Rather we will develop a profound gatekept network for our own operation, one that layers together all the concerns of economics, trade, security and technology - as if we were designing a technical system for fast, constant links. We will include other nations that want to be a part of it, as long as they are willing to bear certain costs. China is welcome to develop her own system and see whom she might attract inside. She will not be permitted to compel nations to join. And: If China wants the benefits of a US-led order, then Beijing must be prepared to support the maintenance of that order. That means deeper cooperation on everything from nuclear proliferation to the establishment of new international bodies for connected finance, biological research or nuclear de- proliferation. Such an approach resolves, in an instant, the contradictions of our current policy. Here is our gated order, we can say, join ifyou wish and on the terms we both consider best. We should remember: China has much to worry about. Disorder would land on her own hopes for peace and development with a profound, possibly crushing pressure. The international order is not working as well as it might. It does not appear engineered for new stresses. It is in cooperation for the reform of that system that the two nations share an urgent interest. And it