So though no inherent enmity exists between the two countries, a crack emerges. Each side finds reasons not to cooperate. A shared interest in peace - neither side wants a collision, both understand the costs - is shimmied apart by a perception gap. Cultural, historical, temperamental and ideological differences accelerate the unzipping of even the best intentions. Misunderstanding bends and then snaps irrevocably into mistrust. So yes, the recovered islands and the trade tensions and the political theories have to be managed because each is a blister that limits forward motion - but the real source of friction? It is the scraping of different world views. This is deep strategic misalignment. It is, in fact, the stuff of war. In recent years, America has had two different, nearly opposite approaches to China, each however marked by an assured national confidence that the current world order is sustainable. One policy is short-handed as “engagement” - or, colloquially, “panda hugging.” As China becomes more prosperous, this approach suggests, she will become more congenial to American interests. More cuddly. This was, for some, the basis for bringing China into the World Trade Organization in the 1990s. Later it justified deep commercial links and educational ties. The logic of such an approach fit the mindset of many baby-boomer Americans: China’s attraction to MTV, McDonalds and Mercedes hinted at a still deeper desire they thought. To be Western. China’s citizens would surely become more attracted and committed to the world system that had delivered all this prosperity. The country would become more global, in a sense, and /ess Chinese. In fact, as China has grown in recent years she has become more global and more Chinese. Growth, wealth, an admixture of confidence into the old national habit of insecurity - all of these have encouraged a searching exploration. The demands of domestic politics, the instincts of the Chinese Communist Party and the inevitable pract