4.2.12 WC: 191694 forward and sue. If Clinton was prepared to pay $700,000 to settle a suit he regarded as utterly frivolous and untrue, no greater incentive would have been added if he defaulted and paid. The sad reality is that Robert Bennett, perhaps in his zeal to chalk up a high visibility win, failed or neglected to tell the president that this was one case that was better for the client to lose and avoid testifying rather than to win and risk testifying falsely. Defaulting the Jones case would have resulted in bad headlines the next day—and perhaps for an additional week. But testifying about his sex life resulted in a dangerous threat to the Clinton presidency — a threat which would not materialize for several months. Thus we see another instance of the President making a decision which helped him in the short run — by avoiding the negative headlines of a settlement or default — but hurt him greatly in the long run. It was a pattern that would persist. On January 26, 1998, President Clinton, with the assistance of Hollywood producer Harry Thomason , decided to make a public statement denying a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Pointing his finger at the TV camera for emphasis, he said: “T want you to listen to me. I’m going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time — never. These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for the American People.” This statement, made directly to the American public and not under oath, has come back to haunt Clinton. Why did he make it? He was under no legal obligation to make any statement. He could easily have said, as so many others have said, “Since the matter is now the subject of a legal proceeding, my lawyers have advised me to make no public comment about it. I’m sure you understand.” But instead, he issued a firm denial of what he would later have to admit was essentially true: namely that he did, in fact, h