4.2.12 WC: 191694 In light of Judge Gifford’s attitudes and professional background in regard to rape, it might be wondered how the prosecution got so lucky as to have her as the judge in the Tyson case. Luck, however, played no part in the selection. Using Indianapolis law and practice, the prosecutor was able to pick the judge who will try a criminal case. I am aware of no other place in the free world where a prosecutor has this ability, other than in Indiana. And the prosecutor picked wisely, if not fairly. Several distinguished commentators—including Indiana’s leading authority on criminal procedure—concluded that the trial judge committed a serious legal error by excluding the three crucial witnesses. Articles in Zhe American Lawyer and the New York Law Journal—teached the same conclusion, as did most of the lawyers and law professors with whom I conferred. Despite the strong issues that she knew could be presented on appeal, Judge Gifford denied Tyson bail pending appeal, apparently accepting the prosecutor’s silly argument that this celebrity defendant would somehow sneak away and flee to a country with no extradition treaty with the United States. She also ruled that all the appellate issues would be “frivolous.” Finally, as if to prove she was an advocate rather than a judge, she actively lobbied in the media against any reversal of the conviction, convening a press conference and, according to news accounts, “express[ing| some worries about having her ruling overturned, especially in an internationally publicized case in which prosecution costs alone reached $150,000.” She commented on “the enormousness of the reversal of the a case that would have to be tried again like this.” We were advised by several local lawyers that she also personally lobbied the appellate judges against reversing the conviction. These actions were completely unethical, and in direct violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but apparently acceptable in Indiana. The case was a cl