4.2.12 WC: 191694 prohibited. Ifa particularly inappropriate expression that had not been included in the codification were then to be used, the committee could consider including it for future discipline, but it could not be the basis for imposing discipline for speech that took place prior to its inclusion in the codification. The virtue of a code is that it completely occupies the area of sanctions. It leaves no room for “common law crimes” or broad decanal discretion. The vice of a code is that it is often underinclusive—it excludes conduct (or, in this case, speech) that is novel, or that was not considered by the codifiers. In the area of freedom of expression, the virtue of such a limitation trumps its vice, at least in my view. It is far better to have rules regulating speech that are underinclusive than overinclusive. In 2007, I taught a university-wide course with Professor Steven Pinker on the issue of Taboo. The question posed by the course was whether there are any issues that are so delicate, sensitive, controversial, or disgusting that they should be treated as “taboos,” even on a university campus dedicated to open dialogue and the free exchange of views. Most Americans are brought up to believe in freedom of expression, but almost everyone has at least one type of speech that he/she would suppress. In our course, we searched for a theory of taboo — a description or prescription of genres of expression that lay outside the presumption of discussability and are, or should be, subject to suppression, censorship or tabooization. Professor Pinker presented some evolutionary and psychological arguments for the existence and utility of some taboos, while questioning many of the taboos that currently seem to exist on university campuses. I discussed the legal and moral arguments for and against any exceptions to the general presumption of free expression. In the end, there was little agreement, except that there is and should be a difference between societa