Page 42 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *913 professional, rival, and politically accountable executive branch officials. The msight of the U.S. approach is that, for many types of [*914] underenforcement, federal oversight combined with democratically responsive local prosecutors can perform the same function as judicial review and private prosecution of correcting bad declination decisions driven by institutional allegiances, cultural biases, and favoritism. Politically responsive criminal justice sometimes works relatively well at changing prosecution practices to serve victim interests that majorities or strong interest groups embrace. Politics has brought meaningful reforms to prosecution for drunk driving, for example, and it has led to improvements, if still msufficient ones, regarding domestic violence and sexual assault crimes. But political accountability has not worked as well to remedy underenforcement when key victim groups have less public sympathy, or key defendant groups, such as police, have a lot. Redundant prosecution authority, in the form of federal oversight, has a similarly mixed track record. Federal law has done much to compensate for state underenforcement of public corruption offenses. It has made significant but less ambitious and successful commitments in the context of police violence. And federal authorities so far have attempted to reinforce state sexual assault enforcement only at the margins. The track record of the U.S. responses to underenforcement, then, is mixed. But it is not clear that the alternative safeguards that predominate elsewhere are, on their own, clearly superior. Private prosecution is little use for victims with few financial resources or who are legally unsophisticated. Judicial review of declination can be exceedingly deferential, especially if statutes and regulations do not provide courts with clear criteria against which to assess prosecutorial decision making. Jurisdictions strongly committed to reducing unjust