Page 34 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *910 Successes notwithstanding, reliance on this kind of political supervision cannot be an equally effective remedy for underenforcement across all contexts. The independence of local prosecution and police agencies means that policies, resources, and constituent support for rigorous enforcement inevitably vary. 7?! They will differ not only across localities but also according to the type of offense and the identity of the victim. Some groups, such as victims of intoxicated drivers, can succeed at achieving more rigorous enforcement policies. 737 Other victims with less political support or popular sympathy - undocumented immigrants, sex workers, prison inmates, and casualties of police shootings 777 - have dimmer prospects when prosecutors are responsive to local majorities’ preferences. In some places, public [*911] sentiment is a force in favor of charging in categories of wrongdoing that have suffered from patterns of underenforcement. In other places, the same can be a force against charging and can reinforce underenforcement practices. Either way, electoral accountability can lead to undue pressure on prosecutors to yield to majoritarian or interest-group pressure to avoid "commiting political suicide." 734 In short, political supervision, as an institutional structure to minimize unjustified failures to prosecute, is an institutional structure with a highly uneven track record and decidedly mixed prospects. On the other hand, some of the strategies for enforcement redundancy examined above that take the form of legal entitlements would likely also achieve partial success. Private prosecution is an unpromising device to aid certain marginalized victim groups such as inmates, undocumented immigrants, or low-income people generally. Other options - review of declination by courts, or concurrent jurisdiction of a separate prosecution agency - hold somewhat more promise. Judicial review is somewhat more removed from political