Page 33 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *908 rationale that oversight of prosecutors lies in the political process rather than judicial enforcement of legal parameters for charging. 7!8 Third, popular and political pressure has succeeded in redressing some underenforcement practices by prosecutors (and police) when victim groups, or issues tied to specific offenses, achieve political potency. Intoxicated driving is perhaps the best example of harmful wrongdoing about which many enforcement agencies have successfully revised their policies to increase enforcement. 7!? Domestic violence and sexual assaults are other examples where enforcement shifts have been more limited but still significant. ?7° Responses by local agencies to this type of pressure have taken three basic forms. First, chief prosecutors adopted internal office policies that mandate - or set a strong presumption for - [*909] prosecution of specific crimes when evidence is sufficient. 2! Second, prosecutors get specialized training on how to address the particular challenges posed by specific kinds of cases such as domestic violence or sexual assault. 7*? Finally, many offices have established dedicated, in-house units of prosecutors who specialize in these same kinds of crimes. 77+ States legislatures have encouraged these reforms, 774 but virtually everywhere, the adoption, content, and enforcement of policies is left to local chief prosecutors. No legislation sets specific charging criteria, authorized judicial review, or gives enforceable rights to victims. 77> These responses to underenforcement are meaningful, but their form is more political than legal. They are the kinds of responses produced by a system of electorally accountable prosecutors and legislatures. 7° Often they are in large part attributable to successful political efforts by advocacy groups. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for example, successfully urged reforms of laws and enforcement practices against intoxicated driving. 77’