Page 32 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *906 prosecutors to reverse their earlier non-prosecution decisions (or, occasionally, to appointing substitute prosecutors). This "executive separation of powers" model has proven effective, although whether it is effective enough is debated; it depends on whether all cases of police violence that should have been prosecuted - based on the evidence and the public interest in enforcement - were prosecuted. State and federal prosecution offices have distinct professional cultures and are responsive to different constituencies and modes of political supervision, which increases the independence of one from the other. 7!3 On the other hand, federal prosecution is still to some degree political; it varies with the policy priorities of presidential administrations 214 to a degree that judicial review [*907] (in theory) should not. When there is less federal commitment to oversight of states’ approaches to police violence, enforcement redundancy is weak. 7!° Victims and other interested parties have no other recourse. C. Underenforcement and Prosecutor Political Accountability In short, U.S. strategies of enforcement redundancy have a relatively strong track record for some crimes such as public corruption, are robust but vulnerable to political shifts for others such as a police violence, and are notably weak with regard to certain offenses, such as sexual assaults. That last category is important because that weakness extends well beyond sexual assault offenses; many of the routine crimes that make up typical state criminal dockets are not within the scope of federal criminal law enforcement. And since private prosecution and judicial or administrative review of prosecutorial decisions are almost completely absent from state criminal justice systems, there is no charging-decision oversight of state prosecutors’ declination decisions and enforcement policies - save for local electoral accountability. In forty-five of fifty states, ch