Page 30 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *902 Responses to unjustified police violence reveal a third outcome for enforcement redundancy confined to the federalism model. Federal enforcement authority extends to cases of police violence to a much greater degree than for sexual assaults. That authority extends as well to other kinds of bias-motivated wrongdoing by both private actors and government officials, which local police and prosecutors have at times ignored or devalued, and for which state-level enforcement commitment continues to be uneven. !” Federal jurisdiction is coextensive with state jurisdiction regarding police wrongdoing, and the Justice Department's institutional capacity for enforcement probably exceeds that of its state counterparts, but in one respect the overlap is not complete. The key substantive criminal offenses available to prosecutors in the federal code are somewhat more restrictive. The primary federal statute used to charge cases of [*903] police excessive use of force requires proof of willful deprivation of rights, 7° a strict mens rea standard that makes it harder for federal prosecutors to prove liability than it would be for state prosecutors relying on typical assault or homicide offense definitions. 7°! The fact that Congress has for decades let stand this mens rea hurdle to excessive-force prosecutions suggests that federal legislators, if not Justice Department officials, are less committed to a full federal-state enforcement redundancy - or "to altering the federal-state balance in order to reinforce state law enforcement" - than they are for public corruption offenses. 7° That limit notwithstanding, federal prosecutions in this area have a track record of succeeding where state prosecutions failed or were never attempted, and in that way providing at least a partial remedy for underenforcement by state criminal justice officials. Much of the federal advantage comes from the fact that federal prosecutors are, in general, better