Page 29 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *900 exception is Professor Donald Dripps's current proposal to expand federal criminal law to cover most sexual assault offenses - precisely the model of federal-state enforcement redundancy that [*901] exists now for drug crimes, corruption, police violence, and much else. !°? But otherwise, existing policies and reform proposals emphasize more modest, although meaningful, federal efforts to improve state justice administration through, for example, funding grants (as for rape kit testing) 193 and occasionally by litigation to force institutional reforms in local agencies. In fact, federal law empowers the U.S. Justice Department to sue local police departments and other agencies, and authorizes structural injunctions to remedy systemic misconduct. !°4 But the Department's use of this authority has largely focused on police violence rather than sexual assault underenforcement. !9° Various local law enforcement agencies have entered consent decrees under which they adopt institutional and policy reforms to reduce patterns of misconduct, even though federal intervention is hampered by the paucity of data on police misconduct, limited federal resources, and at times the political commitment of the presidential administration. !°° More to the point here, in only a few cases have federal officials targeted local agencies' inadequate responses to sexual assault. 197 In sum, and in sharp contrast to public corruption, the problem of underenforcement in the sexual assault context reveals the resistance, and cost, of U.S. criminal justice to institutional structures of enforcement redundancy. Having ruled out judicial review and private prosecution from the imaginations of reform-movement activists, the only alternative is the one that U.S. criminal justice always favors - federalism. Where federal criminal law takes on an enforcement agenda, it is usually effective. 198 Where tradition, politics, jurisdictional limits, or policy [*902]