Page 22 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *888 institutional culture of professionalism than many state prosecutor offices, departmental policies and priorities can change substantially with presidential administrations - as they have recently. !4! Nonetheless, this federalism-based model of prosecutorial oversight has an advantage shared by the administrative review schemes within single prosecution agencies. In both settings, those with review power are prosecutors who should have greater institutional competence and legitimacy to second-guess other prosecutors’ charging decisions, and consequently less inclination than courts to defer to prosecutorial judgments. This federalist model of enforcement redundancy did not evolve from earlier common law institutional arrangements, like private prosecution, nor from the modern victims’ rights movement, like judicial and administrative review of decisions not to prosecute. Federal criminal law enforcement expanded for several reasons, but behind many of those reasons is a common purpose: to remedy glaring patterns of underenforcement by the states. For example, federal law and institutional capacity (such as the advent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) expanded in response to states’ inability to confront adequately the rise of interstate violence and drug crimes (as well as, for a time, prohibition on alcohol manufacture and distribution). !47 Federal law [*889] took on the primary role in combatting local government corruption - including police corruption and excessive uses of force - which local prosecution agencies often lacked the ability, or political independence, to confront. 7 And federal law has long attempted to fill the gap when racially biased local police, prosecutors, and juries declined to arrest, prosecute, or convict suspects - especially white ones - who victimized black citizens. !44 In sum, the redundant enforcement 104 Strafprozebetaordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], §§152, 160, 170, tra