Page 20 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *884 prosecution of excessive police uses of force. Finally, another institution responds to some of the same underenforcement problems that private prosecution and judicial review could address - redundant prosecution authority in a federal system. C. Federalism Safeguards on Prosecutorial Discretion The scope of the U.S. federal crimmal code expanded vastly in the twentieth century, as did the federal government's institutional capacity to enforce that code and its regulatory authority more generally. The result has been a distinctive form of criminal justice federalism: federal enforcement authority wholly overlaps the territorial scope of state criminal law, and the federal code substantially overlaps much of what is covered in state criminal codes. The resulting structure of redundant federal-state authority has evolved into a means - unusual even among federal nation-states - to second-guess and effectively trump state prosecutors’ declination decisions without empowering courts or private parties. No other nation built on a federal model incorporates nearly [*885] the same degree of redundancy between state and federal justice systems. !3! The more common model of criminal justice federalism is found in Canada and Germany: each has a single national criminal code that is administered by separate state-level prosecution agencies and court systems. !3? Other federal states follow the U.S. model and have separate criminal codes, prosecution agencies, and court systems in each state as well as for the federal government. Australia follows this model, but the scope and jurisdiction of Australian federal criminal law is much more limited than is U.S. federal law; federal crimes are largely confined to offenses that implicate distinct federal interests - it is probably closer to U.S. federal criminal law in 1910 than 2010. The result is that in Australia federal criminal law enforcement overlaps much less with state criminal law.