Page 15 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *873 correlative rather than causal, but it nonetheless suggests a reason for why state justice systems took a different path from other common-law jurisdictions and abolished private charging. Local white majorities had little need for a structural check on prosecutors they elected, and they likely did not want a way for African-American citizens to challenge prosecutors and independently pursue their interests in criminal courts. Prosecution redundancy would reduce the control of local majorities to dictate enforcement policies, including preferences for selective underenforcement. B. Judicial and Administrative Review of Decisions Not to Charge A second structure that creates some redundant authority over decisions not to prosecute exposes those prosecutorial decisions to review, either by courts or by supervising officials within an administrative hierarchy. As with private prosecution, this mechanism is almost nonexistent among U.S. jurisdictions, with the significant exception of federal law. But this option has gained ground elsewhere, in England and throughout E.U. countries. In all these contexts, its adoption responds to demands for expanded victims’ rights in the criminal process. This Section briefly surveys prominent examples of noncharging review in federal law and Europe, then considers why state justice systems uniformly reject it. [*874] 1. Oversight of Declination Decisions in Europe Pursuant to an E.U. Directive, !°° twenty-five of the twenty-eight member states of the European Union grant crime victims formal rights to seek review of decisions not to file criminal charges based on their complaints. !°! The details of these review procedures vary. Some authorize judicial review of prosecutors’ decisions; most jurisdictions, including Scotland and France, provide at least a means for review by independent officials within the prosecution agency, perhaps with an additional possibility for judicial review. !°* Alt