Page 8 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *856 group), and favoritism toward the class of perpetrators, law enforcement officers. 4° In the ordinary organization of criminal justice systems, those cases call on officials from one law enforcement agency to assess the evidence against officials from another, even when the agencies regularly work together. +! As in the context of local public corruption, conflict-of-interest rules * are far from adequate to prevent prosecutors from making judgments in light of such professional relationships and circumstances. 43 The possibility of partiality is inevitable. When [*857] that possibility combines with the long history of racial disparities in U.S. criminal justice administration, widespread suspicion of non-prosecution decisions in cases of police violence against minority civilians is hardly surprising, as the Black Lives Matter movement demonstrates. 4 4. Other Underenforcement Contexts Corruption, sexual assaults, and police violence illustrate the key causes and effects of failures to enforce criminal law, but the same forces are recognizably at work in other social contexts. Scholars and advocates have pointed to biases as explanations for inadequate law enforcement responses to offenses against undocumented aliens, sex workers, institutionalized persons, and targets of anti-LGBT hate crimes. * Complaints that police ignored wrongdoing against racial-minority victims in minority communities were prominent in the 1970s and 1980s. 4° Some of [*858] the remedies, however - which included harsher drug laws adopted with substantial support from African American politicians and communities - have proven deeply problematic for those same communities. 47 Finally, less pernicious biases and favoritism are suspected explanations for lenient enforcement patterns in lower-visibility contexts, such as bicyclists killed by motor vehicle drivers, 48 employees injured on the job due to workplace safety violations, and bystanders shot