Page 3 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *847 law enforcement substantially overlap for many categories of crime. Much of this enforcement redundancy, as considered in detail below, has been a deliberate federal response to diverse problems of underenforcement in state criminal justice. The point for now, however, is the functional equivalence of duplicative federal-state jurisdiction, nation-state jurisdiction, and agency jurisdiction. All represent a common strategy to reduce underenforcement by empowering redundant enforcement authorities: independent entities with equivalent institutional capacity and expertise share jurisdiction. If one neglects to enforce, the other may. Functionally, each backstops, or provides oversight of, failures to enforce by the other. A second model for minimizing unjustified failures to prosecute relies on private actors to create redundancy with public prosecutors’ authority. Empowering private actors to file and litigate public law claims is familiar in many civil law contexts; numerous federal statutes authorize private rights of action that enable private individuals or groups to supplement public agencies’ law enforcement efforts. '*° Through much of the nineteenth century, this kind of duplicative public-private enforcement authority was a familiar feature in the criminal justice systems of many states, which permitted private parties - victims - to prosecute alleged criminal wrongdoing. Redundant charging authority takes other forms as well. In large hierarchical agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice, internal administrative review of front-line prosecutors’ charging or declination decisions by higher-ups creates a version of redundant enforcement authority; supervisors can make independent determinations and reverse front-line prosecutors. |!° [*848] This kind of redundancy through administrative review now exists in English, Irish, and many European criminal justice systems. !7 More ambitiously from a U.S. perspectiv