Page 2 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *845 Structural responses to the state declining to use its enforcement authority are much fewer and less prominent. At least in common law countries, enforcement decisions are the province of police and prosecutor discretion, and oversight of officials’ failures to enforce has been left almost wholly to the political process. Decisions to search, arrest, or charge face modest judicial scrutiny on evidentiary grounds and - at the extreme margins - racial or [*846] ethnic bias. ° Decisions not to arrest or charge are virtually immune from judicial review or other nonpolitical oversight. !° Like other common law jurisdictions, U.S. justice systems have always rejected an approach long adopted in some civil law jurisdictions to prevent unjustified and disparate nonenforcement - a rule of mandatory prosecution that restricts executive officials’ discretion over arrest and charging decisions. |! A broader view, however, reveals that all criminal justice systems incorporate one or more strategies to address underenforcement, which can be collectively described as redundant charging authority. All are to some degree familiar, though they are not usually described in these terms or understood as serving this common purpose. One approach is creation of two distinct enforcement agencies with overlapping or duplicative jurisdiction. This model is a familiar safeguard against underenforcement of transnational crimes or crimes on the high seas; international criminal law routinely grants nation-states coextensive, duplicative jurisdiction to enforce international or domestic criminal laws outside their borders. International treaties on subjects such as public corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking |!* can be understood as agreements to create enforcement redundancy among national criminal justice agencies to solve underenforcement problems by particular states. !° The same arrangement occurs domestically for enforcement of civil