evaluate whether the proposed redactions are reasonable. Because the Post cannot review any part of the briefs, it is impossible for the Post to know whether the information it seeks is in the procedural history section of the People’s brief or in other parts of the briefing filed in the Appeal. Moreover, courts must order narrow redactions where possible to avoid overbroad sealing. See, e.g., Burton, 189 A.D.2d at 535-36, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (requiring courts to “consider less drastic alternatives to sealing the records which would adequately serve the competing interests”); Maxim, Inc., 145 A.D.3d at 518, 43 N.Y.S.3d at 316 (“We recognize that it may be easier for the parties and the motion court to seal an entire court record, rather than make a determination on a document by document basis about sealing, but administrative convenience is not a compelling reason to justify sealing.”). In keeping with this State’s strong preference against wholesale sealing of documents, section 50-b expressly permits this Court to release judicial documents after ordering redactions “as it deems necessary . . . to preserve the confidentiality of the identity of the victim.” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-b. Since the only information protected by the statute is identity of Epstein’s victims, the Post respectfully requests an order directing the District Attorney to redact only the names of Epstein’s victims.’ Since the Post does not seek the names of victims of sexual abuse and agrees that these names should be redacted before the appellate briefs are disclosed, there should be no need under the statute to provide notice “to the victim or other person legally responsible for the care of the victim.” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-b(2). But to the extent such notice is necessary, the Post is unable to notify any of the victims on its own because it has no knowledge of which victims (if any) may be identified in the requested documents. If the statute requires victims to be notified 3 Witho