division has been critiqued by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, myself, and others. We can discuss “should” if framed as “we should do X in order to achieve Y.” Which Y should be a high priority is not necessarily settled by democratic vote but might be settled by Darwinian vote. Value systems and religions wax and wane, diversify, diverge, and merge just as living species do: subject to selection. The ultimate “value” (the “should”’) is survival of genes and memes. Few religions say that there is no connection between our physical being and the spiritual world. Miracles are documented. Conflicts between Church doctrine and Galileo and Darwin are eventually resolved. Faith and ethics are widespread in our species and can be studied using scientific methods, including but not limited to fMRI, psychoactive drugs, questionnaires, et cetera. Very practically, we have to address the ethical rules that should be built in, learned, or probabilistically chosen for increasingly intelligent and diverse machines. We have a whole series of trolley problems. At what number of people in line for death should the computer decide to shift a moving trolley to one person? Ultimately this might be a deep-learning problem—one in which huge databases of facts and contingencies can be taken into account, some seemingly far from the ethics at hand. For example, the computer might infer that the person who would escape death if the trolley is left alone is a convicted terrorist recidivist loaded up with doomsday pathogens, or a saintly POTUS—or part of a much more elaborate chain of events in detailed alternative realities. If one of these problem descriptions seems paradoxical or illogical, it may be that the authors of the trolley problem have adjusted the weights on each sides of the balance such that hesitant indecision is inevitable. Alternatively, one can use misdirection to rig the system, such that the error modes are not at the level of attention. For example, in the Tr