more efficiently by machines. The successful creation of AGI would be the biggest event in human history, so why is there so little serious discussion of what it might lead to? Here again, the answer involves multiple reasons. First, as Upton Sinclair famously quipped, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”!” For example, spokesmen for tech companies or university research groups often claim there are no risks attached to their activities even if they privately think otherwise. Sinclair’s observation may help explain not only reactions to risks from smoking and climate change but also why some treat technology as a new religion whose central articles of faith are that more technology is always better and whose heretics are clueless scaremongering Luddites. Second, humans have a long track record of wishful thinking, flawed extrapolation of the past, and underestimation of emerging technologies. Darwinian evolution endowed us with powerful fear of concrete threats, not of abstract threats from future technologies that are hard to visualize or even imagine. Consider trying to warn people in 1930 of a future nuclear arms race, when you couldn’t show them a single nuclear explosion video and nobody even knew how to build such weapons. Even top scientists can underestimate uncertainty, making forecasts that are either too optimistic— Where are those fusion reactors and flying cars?—or too pessimistic. Ernest Rutherford, arguably the greatest nuclear physicist of his time, said in 1933—less than twenty-four hours before Leo Szilard conceived of the nuclear chain reaction—that nuclear energy was “moonshine.” Essentially nobody at that time saw the nuclear arms race coming. Third, psychologists have discovered that we tend to avoid thinking of disturbing threats when we believe there’s nothing we can do about them anyway. In this case, however, there are many constructive things we can do, if we can g