Morality Games 301 This explanation for the omission—commission distinction leads to two novel predictions: First, for judgments and emotions not evolved to motivate witnesses to punishment but to, say, motivate witnesses to avoid dangerous partners (such as the emotion of fear; in contrast to anger or moral disgust), the omission-commission distinction is expected to be weaker or disappear altogether. Second, for transgres- sions of omission that, without any private information, can be presumed intentional (such as a mother who allows her child to go hungry or a person who does not give to a charity after being explicitly asked), we would not expect much of an omis- sion-commission distinction in moral condemnation. As with the all models discussed in this chapter, the game theoretic explanation for the omission—commission distinction does not rest on rational, conscious, stra- tegic calculation. In fact, in this particular case, all reasonable evolutionary dynamic models lead away from punishing omissions. The fact that the above results do not rest on rational, strategic thinking is particularly important in this setting since there is evidence that the distinction between omissions and commissions is not deter- mined deliberately but rather intuitively (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006) and appears to be evolved (DeScioli et al., 2011) and that consciously considering what others believe is an onerous process (Camerer, 2003; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Hedden & Zhang, 2002). This same model can explain several other puzzling aspects of our morality. The first is the means—by-product distinction. This distinction has been documented in studies that ask respondents to judge the following variants of the classic “trolley” problem. In the standard trolley “switch” case (Foot, 1967), a runaway trolley is hurtling toward a group of five people. To prevent their deaths, the trolley must be switched onto a side track where it will kill an innocent byst